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Abstract—As reliance on power networks has increased over
the last century, the risk of damage from geomagnetically induced
currents (GICs) has become a concern to utilities. The current
state of the art in GIC modelling requires significant geophysical
modelling and a theoretically derived network response, but
has limited empirical validation. In this work, we introduce a
probabilistic engineering step between the measured geomagnetic
field and GICs, without needing data about the power system
topology or the ground conductivity profiles. The resulting
empirical ensembles are used to analyse the TVA network (south-
eastern USA) in terms of peak and cumulative exposure to 5
moderate to intense geomagnetic storms. Multiple nodes are
ranked according to susceptibility and the measured response of
the total TVA network is further calibrated to existing extreme
value models. The probabilistic engineering step presented can
complement present approaches, being particularly useful for
risk assessment of existing transformers and power systems.
Index Terms—Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs),
empirical distributions, network risk modelling
I. INTRODUCTION
Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) in power net-
works are driven by variation in the geomagnetic field
(B-field). This is the final link in a chain of coupled systems
with their root in solar disturbances [1]. GIC modelling
has two distinct steps, namely the geophysical step and the
engineering step. The geophysical step aims to model the
entire chain from Sun to ground conductivity and estimate
the induced geoelectric field (E-field), which ultimately drives
GICs. The engineering step uses the estimated E-field as
input and models the network response, taking into account
network specific factors such as topology and resistances,
with transformer-level modelling being the state of the art [2].
Recently, the geophysical step has been the subject of intense
research in the space weather and geophysics communities,
with strong focus on accurate E-field estimates based on
detailed ground conductivity modelling [3], [4]. However, even
with a very detailed and accurate E-field, the engineering step
[5], [6] remains challenging as many factors regarding the
network response are not known or are over simplified.
The approach we describe in this work does away with the
two-step process, empirically linking concurrent B-field and
GIC measurements, implicitly absorbing all driving factors
without making the assumptions required by analytical GIC
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modelling [7]. Such analytical modelling has attempted to
model the geophysical step as accurately as possible but does
not make provision for probability distributions or uncertainty
in parameters, particularly in the engineering step. Previous
probability based analysis has been confined to B-field or
E-field data, linked to GIC estimates purely through analytical
modelling, and has focused mostly on extreme value analysis
of possible GIC risk [4], [8], [9] or hazard analysis [10].
Instead, a novel and practical method is used to analyse the
susceptibility of a network to GICs by utilising (usually very
limited) measured data sets in a way that provides probabilistic
rather than exact estimates of the engineering step.
Fig. 1. TVA HV network map with the substations analysed indicated.
Measured GIC data used in this paper is from the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) network (see Figure 1). Such typical
mid-latitude networks are susceptible to GICs, as seen during
the Halloween Storm of 2003 where there was limited damage
in high-latitude regions but large accumulated transformer
damage in mid-latitude southern African networks [5].
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section II
describes the chain of events leading to GICs, and in Section
III we lay out our novel approach to GIC modelling, which
results in probabilistic estimates for network parameters. In
Section IV, the data used is described and results of analysis
in the TVA network during 5 geomagnetic storms is presented.
Finally, in Section V we discuss further implications of anal-
ysis in the TVA network and extrapolate exposure to extreme
event scenarios.
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Fig. 2. A simplified factor flow for GICs in mid-latitude networks.
II. FACTOR CHAIN DRIVING GICS
In Figure 2, the chain of events from solar activity to
GIC is depicted, with emphasis on factors with large effects
at mid-latitudes. Solar activity occurs in an 11-year solar
cycle. During active periods, eruptions of plasma from the
Sun known as coronal mass ejections (CMEs) expel plasma
across space, impacting the near-Earth environment and caus-
ing geomagnetic storms. Geoeffectivity of plasma impacts are
determined by the (i) position of the eruption on the solar
disk, (ii) the conditions in the prevailing solar wind, and (iii)
the ‘solar wind-magnetosphere-ionosphere’ (SMI) coupling. If
the near-Earth environment is still disturbed after a previous
event, the effects from a follow-up event may be more intense
than for otherwise quiet conditions. The B-field perturbations
measured by mid-latitude observatories on the ground are due
to the dynamics of near-Earth current systems. At mid-latitudes
it is largely the east-west magnetospheric ring current that
generates storm time perturbations [11] for which the SYM-H
(or lower resolution Dst) index is a coarse proxy. Ground
perturbations in the B-field induce an E-field, modulated by
the frequency weighted ground conductivity of the region [12].
The induced E-field then drives low-frequency GICs, which
are ultimately dependent on the wider network characteristics,
often defined by network parameters. An alternative method
of modelling GICs is to use a transfer function between the
B-field and GIC, absorbing ground conductivity and network
parameter effects [13].
In a probabilistic model of typical GIC exposure in a mid-
latitude network, each link in the space physics chain could
be assigned a probability distribution. For a coarse suscep-
tibility estimate at mid-latitudes, the SYM-H distribution is
representative of the driving geomagnetic storms. Cumulative
SYM-H has further been linked to derived cumulative E-field
activity in bulk extreme value studies [14]. In reality, further
fine adjustments affect the local E-field and resulting GICs.
Ground inhomogeneities and the coastal effect enhance the
E-field along a geophysical strike. Local time plays a role,
with the response to storm sudden commencement (SSC)
and geomagnetic storm peak being different in different local
time sectors. SYM-H however merges all these effects into a
single proxy that characterises geomagnetic storms and can be
calibrated against.
III. EMPIRICAL MODELLING OF NETWORK FACTORS
After taking into account all the geophysical factors and
deriving an E-field, the majority of current GIC modelling
assumes a simplistic network model under dc driving [7].
Besides errors from the geophysical step propagating into this
coarse approximation, the network also plays an active part
in the GIC chain, with nodes influencing each other and even
transformers influencing each other within nodes [2]. Other
factors include complex grounding, split driving in different
transmission lines due to topology, quasi-ac driving and the
general state of the system. Furthermore, there are medium-
term temporal sensitivities as a network under stress from
recent geomagnetic activity would have increased sensitivity
to subsequent storms. This makes consecutive storms or mod-
erate, but long duration events particularly dangerous.
GIC at a node at time t can be modelled as,
GIC(t) = αEx(t) + βEy(t), (1)
with the α and β network parameters having units of [Akm/V]
[7]. These network parameters scale the northward (Ex) and
eastward (Ey) components of the E-field respectively, absorb-
ing any errors in the geophysical modelling of the E-field
and the network response. Assuming the E-field is perfectly
aligned to the network, the absolute network parameter scaling
would be
√
α2 + β2. Larger network parameters result in
larger GICs for particular E-field components. A time series
of simultaneous GIC and E-field measurements can be used to
create an ensemble of α and β estimates using pairwise com-
binations of linear equations represented by (1). The resulting
parameter ensembles define the effective network response,
taking into account the entire network, non-trivially weighted.
The TVA measurements, coupled with derived E-field data for
the same region, provide a suitable dataset representative of a
HV network under moderate GIC driving.
This approach differs to previous modelling that assumes a
single network parameter value. Coupled with the represen-
tative SYM-H distribution, we now have a coarse framework
for susceptibility at a node. In this paper, for each event a
random set of time instances above the median GIC level
was chosen to produce an ensemble with a million estimates.
Due to all combinations being used, only around 1 400 time
instances are needed to produce the ensembles. Final estimates
for nodal network parameters take the mean of multiple runs of
different event ensembles, ensuring convergence. An example
for the WEAK node in Mar 2015 is shown in Figure 3. For
each ensemble, the most probable estimate is associated with
the central peak, defined by the median of the distribution
due to the distribution’s heavy tails. The spread or variance in
estimates is defined by the interquartile range and is driven by
unmodelled aspects or errors in the modelling chain.
For each estimate of the network parameters, a further
effective network directionality can be calculated,
θ = arctan (α/β). (2)
The bearing θ takes into account the entire network and is
the effective network direction that when aligned with the
E-field creates the largest GICs, i.e. it modulates the driving
E-field. No matter how large the E-field, if alignment is limited
then so is the resulting GIC. An example of a directionality
Fig. 3. WEAK network parameter ensembles for the March 2015 geomagnetic
storm, with the interquartile range defining the spread. Lower panel shows the
effective network directionality with a local corner resulting in a SSE/SE peak.
ensemble is shown for the WEAK node in Figure 3. Here two
incident lines at a local corner contribute to the majority of
the effective directionality, but the entire network is taken into
account [15]. Since GICs are measured by a Hall-effect sensor
on the transformer neutral, polarity is dependent of the set-up.
IV. MEASURED GIC ANALYSIS IN TVA NETWORK
GICs affect a network in two distinctly different ways.
The impulsive effect from large peak GICs can result in
thermal heating in transformers and possible voltage control
maloperation. This effect has long been known and has been
the topic of most GIC research and modelling, recently being
the focus of the NERC benchmark for utility planning [6]. A
further effect not often taken into account is the cumulative
damage from low-level driving, which can occur from GICs
as low as 6 A [5], [16]. Over an 11-year solar cycle, such
accumulated damage is guaranteed – ultimately resulting in
accelerated ageing of transformers and premature failure. The
state of the system, maintenance, age of existing equipment
and previous GIC stress can all add to the impact of accumu-
lated damage. In the scenario of a system operating above its
capacity with excessive voltage control required, as is the case
with loadshedding, susceptibility increases.
A. Data
GIC data from substations in the TVA network have been
used for large scale empirical validation. Such network-wide
analysis differs from both full-network modelling, typically
with no measured validation of the modelling, and the small
scale validation of measurements at single nodes often done.
The 2 s cadence GIC data have been cleaned for transient
spikes and diurnal variation due to temperature. B-field data
sampled at 1 s cadence from the nearest geomagnetic obser-
vatory (Fredericksburg) were resampled to 2 s cadence for
consistency and used to derive the E-field using a global
average conductivity profile [17]. A global profile is not
perfect but reproduces the relative frequency scaling expected
when inhomogeneities in the ground conductivity are averaged
over the induction footprint of the network [3], without any
further modelling or measurement required. Such an approach
is critical for utilities in regions with limited previous elec-
tromagnetic surveys. Any errors in the fine structure of the
E-field should be consistent across the network with relative
susceptibility still accurate, and more importantly comparable.
B. Geomagnetic Events
To determine the baseline GIC exposure in the TVA net-
work, 5 different geomagnetic storms have been analysed.
The first 3 are CME driven storms and are impulsive in
nature, associated with peak GIC values. The last 2 events
are co-rotating interaction region (CIR) driven storms, not
often regarded due to their low-level of peak GIC activity
but which may nevertheless lead to cumulative exposure. The
characteristics of the events in terms of impulsive peak GIC
exposure are summarised in Table I, and cumulative sustained
GIC exposure in Table II.
TABLE I
GEOMAGNETIC STORMS CHARACTERISTICS
Date
(Type)
SYM-H
Min
[nT]
SYM-H
Min
[UTC]
E-field
Max
[mV/km]
Ex and
Ey
GIC
Max
[A]
TVA
Node
11-13/09/2014
(CME)
-97 23:03
12/09
93.48
131.56
24.47 PARA
16-22/03/2015
(CME)
-234 22:47
17/03
89.80
113.97
14.12 MONTa
22-29/06/2015
(CME)
-208 04:24
23/06
74.16
168.14
16.04 PARA
05-09/10/2015
(CIR)
-124 22:23
07/10
44.66
37.88
9.19 PARA
15-18/02/2016
(CIR)
-60 00:28
18/02
36.08
35.14
8.03 PARA
aNo PARA data for given event
TABLE II
GEOMAGNETIC STORMS CUMULATIVE CHARACTERISTICS
Date and
Duration
[Hours]
SSC
Onset
[UTC]
SYM-H
RMS
[nT]
E-field
RMS
[mV/km]
Ex and
Ey
GIC
RMS
[A]
TVA
Node
11-13/09/2014
41.7
15:53
12/09
25.52 3.82
5.73
0.77 PARA
16-22/03/2015
138.6
04:45
17/03
71.65 5.54
6.03
1.34 MONTa
22-29/06/2015
166.1
18:33
22/06
68.38 4.83
6.03
1.83 PARA
05-09/10/2015
83.5
N/Ab 51.29 4.064.34
1.55 PARA
15-18/02/2016
69
N/Ab 35.20 3.76
3.23
0.75 PARA
aNo PARA data for given event
bCIR event with no obvious sudden storm commencement (SSC)
The span of each storm is defined as the period from sudden
impulse, when an interplanetary shock hits the magnetosphere,
through to when the magnetosphere recovers to quiet time
levels, i.e. when SYM-H recovers to greater than -20 nT after
having reached a minimum value at the peak of the storm
[14]. The cumulative value of SYM-H is taken as the minutely
RMS of the storm to allow for comparisons between storms of
different lengths. Multiplying the RMS by the duration gives
an idea of the total exposure for a single storm. To avoid noise
levels, the GIC and E-field RMS values are defined as the 2
s cadence RMS above the median level for each.
To contextualise the 5 geomagnetic events, a complimentary
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) is defined using
all geomagnetic storms with minimum SYM-H < −50 nT
between 1981 and 2018, identified according to the algorithm
described by [14]. Figure 4 shows the CCDF of SYM-H RMS.
The 5 events analysed are indicated with vertical lines and their
probabilities are listed in the legend. The probability associated
with each event indicates the fraction of events (totalling 981
in the 38 year interval) with RMS SYM-H smaller than the
event. For example, 0.15 (15%) of all events will be less
intense than the weak cumulative Sep 2014 event, i.e. we
expect about 0.85 or 241 events to be larger over the course of
an average solar cycle, modulated by the peak occurrence at
solar maximum and declining phase [18]. For the most intense
cumulative event, Jun 2015, roughly 11 larger events can be
expected over a solar cycle. For the weakest event in terms
of minimum SYM-H reached, Feb 2016, we expect around
210 larger events to occur per solar cycle. For Mar 2015, the
most intense impulsive event at -234 nT, we expect roughly
10 more intense events per solar cycle.
Fig. 4. Complimentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of SYM-H
RMS for all storms with minimum SYM-H< −50 nT for 3.5 solar cycles.
C. Measured Results and Risks
Using measured GIC data, the susceptibility of the various
nodes in the TVA network can be ranked in terms of impulsive
and cumulative exposure. In Figure 5, the maximum measured
GIC at each node is shown per storm, with the CME storms
having larger peak GICs. PARA, a terminal north-south node,
is the most susceptible, having the entire network southward
act as a catchment area. Other local corner nodes such as
WEAK and WCRK are also more affected. Adjacent nodes
can also be associated with the larger GIC flows at terminal
nodes, as seen at MONT and RCCN. When a series capacitor
is present, a line is effectively removed. Network information
is needed to confirm such cases in the TVA network.
The cumulative exposure seen in Figure 6, similarly shows
PARA as the most susceptible node. Of interest is the differ-
ence in storm response, where the Sep 2014 storm is highly
impulsive with large a peak GIC, the Jun 2015 storm has a
larger cumulative effect. This may be due partly to a period of
sustained long-period pulsation driving. Over all events, there
is no clear or consistent pattern, suggesting the local network
and the finer structure of a geomagnetic storm need to be taken
into account. SYM-H identifies geomagnetic storms well, but
no two storms are the same.
Fig. 5. Peak GIC measured in the TVA network for 5 geomagnetic storms.
Fig. 6. Cumulative GIC exposure in the TVA network, as defined by the
RMS of GIC above the median GIC level for each geomagnetic storm.
D. Ensemble Modelled Results and Risk Ranking
In order to characterise the network in finer detail, the
network parameter ensembles defined in Section III are used.
In order to minimise low-level noise at certain substations, the
GIC and E-field data used for ensemble estimation (and trend
fitting later in Figure 7) were resampled to 4 s cadence and
only data above the median level used. The resulting network
parameter scaling and effective directionality for each node
given the event coverage is summarised in Table III.
In general terms, larger network parameters relate to larger
susceptibility. PARA is the most susceptible node at around
241 Akm/V, with a defined risk rank of 1.0. This is twice as
much as the next highest node, MONT, with a relative risk rank
of 0.5. The ratio of the average network parameter spread and
total network scaling gives an indication of the certainty of the
estimate and complexity of the local network. WEAK has the
most certainty in its network parameter ensemble, followed
TABLE III
NODE SPECIFIC ENSEMBLE RESULTS AND RISK IN THE TVA NETWORK
Nodea
(Risk
Geog.
Lat.
Geog.
Lon. n
b Network Parameters
Median ± Spread Bearing
Rank) α β θ
PARA
(1.00)
37.3◦ -87.0◦ 4 -241.05
± 254.66
-8.72
± 383.88
182◦
WEAK
(0.50)
36.3◦ -88.8◦ 4 -94.69
± 117.44
73.27
± 146.45
142◦
MONT
(0.48)
36.6◦ -87.2◦ 5 -111.14
± 118.58
35.20
± 165.46
162◦
WCRK
(0.44)
34.9◦ -85.7◦ 5 72.45
± 118.60
78.74
± 123.81
47◦
BULL
(0.41)
36.1◦ -84.0◦ 3 -59.84
± 113.50
-79.15
± 110.04
233◦
SHEL
(0.26)
35.4◦ -89.8◦ 4 -62.97
± 141.23
3.73
± 177.28
177◦
RCCN
(0.22)
35.1◦ -85.4◦ 3 -42.37
± 67.48
-31.70
± 73.77
217◦
BRAD
(0.19)
35.1◦ -84.9◦ 5 -44.54
± 62.52
8.95
±85.13
169◦
RFRD
(0.14)
35.8◦ -86.6◦ 3 0.67
± 132.55
-33.63
± 144.25
271◦
EPNT
(0.12)
34.2◦ -86.8◦ 1 -25.79
± 37.46
-14.35
± 52.88
209◦
SULL
(0.09)
36.4◦ -82.3◦ 4 21.22
± 82.64
0.17
± 85.25
0◦
SHVN
(0.01)
35.0◦ -90.1◦ 4 1.80
± 184.68
-3.00
± 184.24
301◦
aItalicised nodes display multi-modal directionality, with effective average indicated
bNumber of events (n) with data available
by BULL and WCRK. Italicised cases in Table III indicate
nodes that have multiple lines influencing GIC exposure. The
network parameters choose the most efficient and representa-
tive of these contributions, but in the directionality ensemble
multiple peaks are evident and a larger spread in the network
parameters ensembles is expected. Typically, these nodes are
at complex or interior parts of the network and the multiple
paths allow GICs to dissipate to non-critical levels, minimising
susceptibility as seen in the relative risk ranking.
V. DISCUSSION
From Tables I and II, it is evident that apart from gen-
eral GIC activity, the global SYM-H index is not always
representative of the peak or cumulative GIC in a local
network. A more local E-field is more appropriate for fine
scale characterisation, as can be seen in the Sep 2014 event
where the largest peak GIC ranks as smallest in terms of peak
SYM-H, but largest in peak Ex across events. Since PARA is
a north-south effective node and the most susceptible in the
TVA network, the large Ex produces the peak GIC. More
directly linked to SYM-H is the general east-west E-field
tendency (modulated by local ground conductivity) of the ring
current drivers in both impulsive and cumulative proxies. This
difference between E-field components is particularly apparent
in CME storms, when the ring current is most affected, with
differences during CIR storms small in comparison.
Taking into account the ring current driving at mid-latitudes,
with its most probable east-west E-field, risk is increased if
the effective directionality of a node is east-west. From Table
III, in the TVA network only RFRD is east-west. RFRD is
an interior node with only a short transmission line and as
such is low risk. WCRK and RCCN both have significant NE
and SW contributions from the same part of the network and
appear to link to the stronger east-west driving E-field during
the Sep 2014 event, even though their network parameters are
smaller than other nodes less affected during this event.
Making use of the empirical network parameters that absorb
errors in the geophysical modelling and network assumptions,
the GIC response at a node can be related to more general
parameters. Specifically, the network parameters allow for the
effective direction to be determined and the scaled effective
E-field contributions to be defined,
Eeff = cos (θ)Ex + sin (θ)Ey. (3)
Such a relation can be derived at a node for both peak and
cumulative GIC and E-field exposure, as in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Linear trend between the peak and cumulative effective E-field and
measured GIC at WCRK, which allows for extrapolation to other events.
The relation in both is linear, similar to the assumed linear
network parameters that link E-field and GIC. Variance may
arise from the maxima of the E-field components and GIC
not occurring at the same time. At WCRK, Figure 7 shows
this trend is nevertheless consistent over all 5 events with the
slopes of both cumulative and peak exposure relating to the
absolute network scaling seen in Table III, i.e. m ≈ 107. The
peak driving slope is larger than the RMS driving slope due to
it only considering the largest contributions. Bulk analysis of
more events will result in more accurate relations. In the case
of a large deviation from the relation for an event, the most
likely cause would be a network change such as line switching.
A possible further cause may be a distinctly different structure
of the geomagnetic storm. The Sep 2014 event is an example
of such an outlier, with a particularly large impulsive peak and
significantly smaller cumulative driving in comparison.
The relations between GIC and effective E-field being
consistent, they can be used to extrapolate the local network
exposure to existing extreme value analysis for the E-field
in North America [4]. Similar analysis has been done using
the time dB/dt in New Zealand [19]. Using the 1-in-100
year E-field threshold of roughly 1 V/km estimated for the
TVA region [4], Table III can be interpreted as the resulting
GIC in Amperes for the extreme E-field in the north and east
directions respectively, with the peak exposure at the most
susceptible node (PARA) being around 240 A. One step further
is linking E-field to SYM-H [14] or its low-resolution twin,
Dst [20], and calibrating the local network exposure to a longer
and more global dataset. More GIC event coverage is needed
to validate such bulk relations locally.
Besides the extreme value exposure, given a typical solar
cycle there are specific nodes that are susceptible in the
TVA network. The most susceptible node is PARA, followed
by WCRK, MONT, WEAK and RCCN that have elevated
risk. These local edge nodes should be taken into account
given mitigation efforts, with other nodes having negligible
exposure. Similar cumulative damage risk is seen at PARA,
WEAK, MONT and WCRK, which should inform main-
tenance scheduling. Any maintenance or mitigation efforts
should take into account peak periods of geomagnetic storm
activity, expected at solar maximum and the declining phase of
the solar cycle [18]. During these periods the associated GIC
driving is able to initiate or accelerate accumulated damage.
Although this paper has focussed on mid-latitudes, where
the bulk of power networks lie, a similar probabilistic network
parameter ensemble approach can be applied to the more
geomagnetically complicated high-latitudes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The probabilistic approach presented in this work is able to
inform network-wide geomagnetic risk analysis without the
need for in-depth network information or complex ground
conductivity modelling. Network parameter ensembles are
derived using limited measured GIC and B-field data and form
distributions, rather than typical transformer-level or extreme
value modelling that use single value network parameters in
the engineering step. Given the FERC directive for utilities
to collect measured GIC data [21], the approach employed
is widely applicable. Nodal and network vulnerability can
be identified and calibrated through a general E-field. The
resulting calibration in the TVA network is extrapolated to
extreme value E-fields and given a 1-in-100 year scenario,
GICs of over 200 A at a single node and around 100 A at four
others may be experienced. Using the empirical calibration
of the engineering step, a probability distribution of GIC
magnitude for an existing node can possibly be derived directly
from a probability distribution of storm severity.
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